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Abstract 
Alexithymia, difficulties in facial emotion recognition, poor socio-relational skills are typical of 
Anorexia Nervosa (AN). We assessed patients with AN and healthy controls (HCs) with mixed 
stimuli: questionnaires (Toronto Alexithymia Scale-TAS, Interpersonal Reactivity Index-IRI), 
photographs (Facial Emotion Identification Test-FEIT) and dynamic images (The Awareness of 
Social Inference Test-TASIT). TAS and IRI Personal Distress (PD) were higher in AN than HCs. 
Few or no differences emerged at the FEIT and TASIT, respectively. Despite higher levels of 
alexithymia, patients with AN seem to properly acknowledge others' emotions while being inhibited 
in the expression of their own. 
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Introduction  
Impaired emotional functioning and alexithymic traits are core elements of Anorexia Nervosa (AN). 
(Torres et al., 2015; Courty, Godart, Llalanne, Berthoz, 2015). Patients with AN, compared to 
healthy controls, show a concrete, reality-based cognitive style and a poor inner emotional and 
fantasy life. Jenkins & Connor (2012) suggested the phrase “cognitive-affective division” to 
describe the difficulty shown by patients with Eating Disorders (EDs) when trying to translate what 
they “think” cognitively into what they “feel” emotionally. Poor skills in emotion regulation (ER), 
especially when facing negative moods, may lead patients to eating disordered behaviors, which 
seem to offer a short term comfort or distraction, to the detriment of more adaptive strategies 
(Skårderud, 2007; Smyth et al., 2007; Svaldi, Griepenstroh, Tuschen-Caffiera, Ehringc, 2012). 
Identification of facial information and emotional expression is a core component of social life and 
interpersonal communication, and impaired skills in this cognitive processing ability are likely to 
play a role as regards patients‟ social functioning deficits, social phobia, social isolation, avoidance 
and persistent social impairments, even after recovery from AN (Kaye et al., 2004; Nilsson et al., 
1999). The current literature suggests that, compared to healthy individuals, people with AN have 
deficits in emotion regulation across a variety of domains. Difficulties in recognizing facially 
displayed emotions have been described, although it is not clear whether these are independent from 
alexithymia (Kessler, Schwarze, Filipic, Traue, von Wietersheim, 2006), and whether they are 
influenced by comorbid psychopathological conditions, such as depression (Mendlewicz, 
Linkowski, Bazelmans, Philippot, 2005; Manuel & Wade, 2013; Parling, Mortavazi, Gadheri, 
2010). Apart from difficulties in the recognition of facial emotions, especially negative ones (i.e., 
sadness and fear), people with AN may show impairments in the recognition of emotions in voices, 
both positive and negative (particularly happiness and sadness) (Kucharska-Pietura, Nikolau, 
Masiak, Treasure, 2004).  
There is a debate as whether there are different patterns of emotional processing deficiencies in 
different subtypes of EDs, whether emotional regulation and emotional processing difficulties are a 
  
unique hallmark of EDs, and whether these are state- or trait-dependent conditions. Although ER 
difficulties and social problem solving skills may be impaired in the acute phase of AN, due to the 
direct effects of starvation on the brain [7, 8], there is evidence that women with AN experience 
premorbid social difficulties, and that such difficulties persist after recovery [9]. Beadle et al. 
(2013) found no improvement after weight restoration and suggested that alexithymia and personal 
distress may be trait features of AN. On the contrary, a better performance in emotional inference in 
the self and the others has been found in recovered patients than in currently ill ones by Oldershaw 
and coworkers (2010). Nonetheless, recovered patients compared to healthy controls still showed 
some slight impairment, particularly in recognizing positive emotions; moreover, patients with AN, 
both currently ill and recovered, seemed to be actually making greater efforts than healthy controls 
despite their poorer performance in recognizing emotions. A correlation between ED symptoms and 
severity and measures of ER impairment has been suggested as well (Svaldi et al. [4]; Racine & 
Wildes, 2013).  
The importance of all these issues depends also on the fact that difficulties identifying feelings may 
play the role of maintaining factors for AN and impact on prognosis. These factors are likely not 
disorder-specific for AN (for instance, a possible overlapping between AN and autism spectrum 
disorders has been suggested), nonetheless in people with AN they may interfere with the healing 
process (Oldershaw, Hambrook, Tchanturia, Treasure, Schmidt, 2010). For instance, a 3-year 
longitudinal study (Speranza, Loas, Wallier, Corcos, 2007), found the Difficulty Identifying 
Feelings factor of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale significantly predicted treatment outcome, 
independent of depressive symptoms and ED severity.  
The aim of our study was to add to the existing literature about these issues, comparing alexithymia, 
empathy, facial emotion identification and social inference abilities in people with AN and healthy 
controls (HC). Considering the instruments we used, we also wanted to discriminate whether AN 
patients were more impaired than controls when assessed about alexithymia, ER skills and social 
  
inference via a pencil-and-paper questionnaire, photographs, or dynamic images depicting emotions 
and social interactions (see methods).  
 
Method 
Participants  
We recruited all the patients with a current diagnosis of AN referred to the outpatient and inpatient 
service for Eating Disorders of the Institute of Psychiatry, Maggiore della Carità Hospital, Novara 
(Italy), and to a collaborating Psychiatric Clinic (Casa di Cura San Giorgio, Viverone), in a 2-year 
period (from June 2013 to June 2015), matching the inclusion criteria described hereby. Inclusion 
criteria for the patients‟ sample were: 1) current diagnosis of AN according to DSM-IV-TR 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000); 2) age >18 years; 3) no comorbid psychosis or drug 
abuse; 4) availability to give informed written consent to participate in the study. HCs similar for 
age were recruited among female University students and trainees, their friends and relatives, aged 
>18 years, with no comorbid psychosis or drug abuse and no current or past Axis I diagnosis. 
Assessment and diagnosis of patients and HCs were performed by experienced psychiatrists with 
the aid of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR (SCID-I) (First, Spitzer, Gibbon & 
Janet, 2002). The project was approved by the Institutional Review Board of our Institution. 
Informed consent was obtained.  
Materials 
HCs were given an appointment and tested in a single session. Patients‟ assessment with the aid of 
the SCID-I was performed during the first psychiatric interview; their Body Mass Index (BMI, 
Kg/m
2
) was measured. Patients were then given a second appointment the following week; they 
were asked to fill the self-administered questionnaires and were assessed with the tests described 
hereby. 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Penn et al., 1994; Giumarra et al., 2015) 
  
The IRI is a 28-item self.administered questionnaire assessing four dimensions of dispositional 
empathy: Perspective Taking (PT), Fantasy (F), Empathic Concern (EC), and Personal Distress 
(PD). PT describes the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others; F 
measures the tendency to imaginatively transpose oneself into the feelings and actions of fictitious 
characters in books, movies, and plays. The EC subscale measures other-oriented feelings of 
sympathy and concern for others in distress. The PD subscale assesses self-oriented anxiety when 
experiencing others in distress. Cronbach‟s alphas for the four scales were PT= .54, F= .77, EC= .69 
and PD= .50, respectively. High internal consistency and good test–retest reliability and convergent 
validity were found for the IRI (Davis, 1983). 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) (Bagby, Parker, Taylor, 1994) 
Self-administered 20-item scale assessing the three core elements of the construct: Difficulty 
Identifying Feelings (DIF), Difficulty Describing Feelings (DDF), and Externally Oriented 
Thinking (EOT). This last factor, EOT, also indirectly assesses (reduced) fantasy and imaginal 
activity (Taylor, Bagby, Parker, 1997). A score greater than 61 indicates the presence of 
alexithymia (Bagby, Taylor, Parker, Dickens, 2006). The TAS had good psychometric properties 
(Cronbach‟s alpha 0.81; test-retest reliability 0.77). 
Facial Emotion Identification Test (FEIT) (Kerr & Neale, 1993; Erol, Mete, Sonmez, Unal, 2010) 
The FEIT is an interactive computer task containing facial expression stimuli (posed by actors) 
associated with 6 basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise), and neutral 
faces. The task includes 55 black and white photos presented on a computer screen for 15 seconds, 
then immediately replaced by a blank screen. Participants are asked to indicate the emotion seen by 
pressing a labeled key on the keyboard as soon as they identify it. The software then calculates the 
number of correct answers for each emotion subset, a total score and reaction times. Cronbach's 
alphas were as follows: nonclinical controls, alpha = .37; acute-care participants, alpha = .52; and 
extended-care participants, alpha = .41.  
  
The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT) (Rollins, Flanagan, McDonald, 2002) 
The TASIT is divided into three parts. Part 1 - Emotion Evaluation Task – EET : 28 short (15–60 
seconds) video clips of social interactions, each featuring one of the six primary emotions 
(happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, disgust and fear) or neutral affect. Each emotion (including 
neutral affect) is represented in four different video clips. The participants are required to identify 
the emotional state of the central protagonist by making a forced choice from seven emotional 
descriptors presented simultaneously in a paper chart. Part 2 and 3 – Social Inference Minimal and 
Enriched (SI-M and SI-E) consist of 15 and 16 short (15-60 seconds) videoclips, respectively, 
including sincere, false and sarcastic dialogues, so that the subject has to infer the real meaning of 
the message by observing the affective state of the person talking (facial expression, tone of voice), 
and the environment. Cronbach's alpha for the TASIT is 0.81(Roberts & Penn, 2009).  
Both the FEIT and TASIT have already been used together for the assessment of social cognition in 
schizophrenic patients (Galderisi et al., 2014). 
Data analyses 
All the analyses were performed using the statistical software STATA MP11 (Stata Corp., 2007). 
Initial descriptive statistics included frequencies and percentages for categorical variables and the 
chi-squared test to evaluate the differences in proportions between groups. The continuous variables 
were reported using the mean and the standard deviation. Normal distribution of data was verified 
using Shapiro-Wilk test. Mean comparison between groups was carried out using Student‟s t-test. 
A two-tailed p value < .05 was considered significant for all analyses. 
 
Results 
We enrolled 87 subjects, including 39 patients with AN (44.83% of the whole sample) and 48 HCs  
(55.17% of the whole sample). The mean age of the whole sample was 32.02±2.26 years; in AN it 
was 30.59±3.00 and in HCs it was 33.19±3.37. In regards to patients‟ diagnosis, 27 patients 
(69.23% of the patients‟ group) had AN restricting subtype, and 12 AN binge-purging subtype 
  
(30.77%). Mean BMI was 16.3 Kg/m
2
 in patients with AN and 21.82 Kg/m
2
 in HCs. Differences 
were found as far as occupational status and schooling are concerned, since most HCs were students 
and trainees. No difference in marital status emerged. See Table 1 for details. 
Table 2 reports the results of the comparison of the two groups as far as the self-administered 
questionnaires and assessments are concerned. The TAS score was significantly higher in patients 
with AN than in HCs, and the first scored higher on all TAS subscales, except for EOT. As regards 
the FEIT, a significantly lower rate of patients with AN proved able to correctly recognize fear and 
a significantly higher rate of patients with AN correctly recognized disgust, compared to HCs; for 
the other five emotions (happiness, sadness, neutral, anger, surprise) no significant difference was 
found between the two groups. The comparison of the AN and HC groups yielded no statistically 
significant result as far as the TASIT is concerned. The only IRI factor showing a significant 
difference between the two groups was IRI-PD, and patients with AN scored higher than HCs. 
 
Discussion 
TAS 
The TAS overall score and TAS-DIF and TAS-DDF scores were significantly higher in AN than 
HCs.  This means that in our sample, as expected, patients with AN showed greater difficulties than 
HCs identifying feelings, distinguishing them from the bodily sensations of emotion (Skårderud, 
2007; Enckell, 2002), and also describing feelings to others. On the contrary, we failed to find a 
significant difference between AN and HCs as far as EOT is concerned. A high score on TAS-EOT 
suggests a reduced fantasy and imaginal activity (Taylor et al., 1997). The literature reports mixed 
results concerning this issue in AN; our results, for instance, are partially in contrast with those by 
Troop and coworkers (1995) who found that patients with restrictive AN had a poorer fantasy life 
when compared to controls. On the other hand, our findings seem in line with those by Torres and 
coworkers (2011), who found patients with AN being able to imagine emotions in hypothetical 
situations and to identify and label them, despite higher levels of overall alexithymia than HCs. 
  
Moreover, they found that the group of patients with AN felt more intense and internally based 
negative emotions in comparison with the control group, especially in situations associated with 
food and weight. They concluded that patients with AN might have preserved meta-emotional 
abilities, and no global deficit in emotional processing, but rather a specific sensitivity for situations 
relevant to their AN. 
IRI 
In our study, the lack of significant differences between patients with AN and HCs in fantasy and 
imaginal activity suggested by the TAS-EOT is supported also by the IRI-F scale. This describes 
the tendency to imaginatively transpose oneself into the feelings and actions of fictitious characters 
in books, movies, and plays, and showed no difference between patients and HCs. Besides this 
result about the F scale, the assessment of empathy with the IRI failed to highlight differences 
between patients with AN and HCs also on the scales of PT and EC. These findings are in contrast 
with an earlier study of alexithymia in AN, which suggested a clinical evidence of empathy disorder 
in a specific subgroup of patients with AN, with high scores on the TAS (Råstam, Gillberg, 
Gillberg, Johansson, 1997). 
In our study the only subscale of the IRI discriminating between the AN and HCs groups was the 
IRI-PD, which was higher in patients with AN. The IRI-PD scale assesses self-oriented anxiety 
when experiencing others in distress and suggests that patients with AN may feel greater discomfort 
than HCs, or experience more difficulties, when faced with others‟ „negative‟ feelings.  
FEIT and TASIT 
Concerning the FEIT, differences emerged only as far as fear and disgust recognition are concerned. 
Patients with AN correctly identified fear in a lower percentage of cases than HCs, but performed 
better than HCs in the correct identification of disgust. Meaningful comparisons with the existing 
literature is currently difficult due to mixed results. For instance,  Jones and coworkers (Jones, 
Harmer, Cowen, Cooper, 2008) observed that patients with more severe ED symptoms are usually 
less precise at recognizing happy and neutral faces when compared to less symptomatic patients. 
  
Severely disordered subjects are also worse at identifying anger, but perform better as far as 
surprised faces are concerned. Patients presenting more severe conditions tended to mislabel happy 
faces as neutral and neutral faces as angry or sad, which can also be observed in depressed patients 
(Leppanen, Milders, Bell, Terriere & Hietanen, 2004). 
In patients with AN it has been described the tendency to inhibit their own sadness and anger in 
interpersonal situations, while reporting high levels of disgust and anger towards themselves and 
their body. The emotions of sadness and fear have been both linked to body disgust and body 
dissatisfaction (Fox & Power, 2009). This background may be helpful to understand our finding 
about patients‟ difficulties to correctly identify fear, while they recognized disgust better then HCs. 
Self-disgust might have a central role in the maintenance of EDs and may be used as a means to 
suppress more ego-dystonic emotions including fear (Fox & Power, 2009). 
 
Last, as far as the TASIT is concerned, no significant difference was found between patients with 
AN and HCs. The TASIT offers complex stimuli including facial displays of emotions, verbal and 
non-verbal language, prosody, action and interaction among characters, all within the context of 
every given scene. Our results seem consistent with those reported in a recent review by Pinar 
Caglar-Nazali and coworkers (2014) about systems for social processes in people with ED. These 
Authors found poor evidence for problems with non-facial communication, animacy and action, 
notwithstanding impaired facial emotion recognition and facial communication, together with 
increased facial avoidance, alexithymia and poor understanding of mental states.  
 
Consistent with the literature, we have found higher total scores on the TAS , and on the TAS DIF 
and DDF in patients with AN. Accordingly, we would have expected patients performing worse 
than HCs on the FEIT and TASIT. However, we found but one only difference between patients 
and HCs in the IRI scores, and we failed to find relevant differences on patients‟ ability in properly 
recognizing and interpreting facial emotions and social interactions from the static and dynamic 
  
stimuli offered by the FEIT and TASIT, respectively. As for the open questions about the possible 
relationship between alexithymia and difficulties in recognizing facially displayed emotions 
(Kessler et al., 2006), our results seem to suggest that these two issues are independent, consistent 
with the preservation of the meta-emotional abilities, despite high levels of alexithymia, described 
by Torres and coworkers (2010). On the other hand, the TAS scores suggest that patients with AN 
might have a specific problem concerning their own emotions.  
Using an analogy between the central nervous system and a computer, we may consider the mind-
brain relationship as the software-hardware one. Ultimately, all software has a physical basis, even 
if it might be reasonable to think of it as “non-physical” in contrast to hardware, which is 
undeniably physical. As far as emotion processing in patients with AN is concerned, the results 
from the three different assessment approaches we used seem to suggest that there might be a 
software rather than a hardware problem (Fodor, 1981). Of course, further studies in larger samples 
and including the assessment of emotional avoidance are warranted to support this hypothesis. 
According to this standpoint, the emotional impairment of patients with AN would not be centered 
on the emotions themselves, but rather depend on something (inhibition or avoidance) which 
happens at a later stage, following the proper acknowledgment of others‟ emotions (Speranza et al., 
2005), Hypotheses have been suggested about the possibility that patients may be overwhelmed by 
over-control and anxious worry (Torres et al., 2011), leading to alexithymia (Troop, Schmidt & 
Treasure, 1995). Moreover, although experiencing similar levels of negative feelings as controls, 
patients with AN may tend to avoid negative affect, or may try to regulate it engaging in behaviours 
such as restrictive eating, purging, and body checking (Corstorphine, 2006; Skårderud & Fonagy, 
2011; Schmidt & Treasure, 2006; Espeset et al., 2012). Therefore, an incongruence between 
expression of negative emotion and inner experience is likely to take place, and patients may inhibit 
the expression of negative feelings according to the belief that these would have aversive 
consequences, damage relationships and create or increase conflict (Davies, Swan, Schmidt, 
Tchanturia, 2012; Ioannou & Fox 2009).  
  
Limitations  
Some limitations should be underscored; the sample size is small, although not so much if 
compared to similar studies in the literature. Of course, studies with a larger sample size would be 
helpful to resolve the conflicting findings of the literature in this field. Moreover, we did not control 
for the use of psychotropic medication, illness duration or age. As far as educational level is 
concerned, it should be noted that the control group includes mainly University students and this 
may represent a bias, although the instruments use for assessments are meant to be culture-
independent. Last, albeit it might have integrated our findings, we did not assess experiential 
avoidance. 
 
Conclusions  
Studies of facial expression emotion identification often used static displays of such expressions, 
namely photographs. Anyway, the network of brain regions decoding these social signals is likely to 
be much more complex, since facial emotional expressions are highly dynamic signals that encode 
the emotion message in facial action patterns. The question whether different neural correlates 
underlie the encoding and decoding of facial expressions of emotion by static or dynamic displays 
is still unanswered. Suggestions have been made (Kilts et al., 2003) that static displays of facial 
emotional expression may represent non-canonical stimuli that are processed for emotional content 
by mental strategies and neural events which are distinct from their more relevant dynamic 
counterparts. Our assessment was comprehensive, and may offer a thorough perspective on these 
issues due to the inclusion of different measures and approaches to the investigation of alexithymia, 
empathy, emotion identification skills and social inference.  
From a clinical standpoint, alexithymia, emotional empathy and social inference may play a role as 
maintaining factors for AN, hence addressing them is not only relevant from a theoretical point of 
view, but also as far as treatment is concerned (Tchanturia et al., 2012). Being aware of poor skills 
in emotional identification and expression in ED patients is necessary to address such problems 
  
with specific treatment strategies aimed at encouraging identification, labeling and sharing of 
emotions. Indeed, a shared conclusion of all studies in this field, independent of the results found, is 
that patients may benefit from an approach aimed at supporting and fostering the identification and 
expression of feelings, and at developing and improving coping strategies in the area of social 
interaction and emotion regulation, especially in order to find alternative strategies to emotional 
inhibition and avoidance.  
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Table 1. Descriptive features of the sample. 
 
 Patients with AN 
% (N) 
HCs 
% (N) 
p 
Occupational status  
Employed 48.72 (19) 4.17 (2) <0.001 
Unemployed 20.51 (8) 2.08 (1) 
Student 30.77 (12) 93.75 (45) 
 
Schooling  
Junior high school 20.51 (8) 2.08 (1) <0.001 
High school 58.97 (23) 6.25 (3) 
Degree 20.51 (8) 91.67 (44) 
 
Marital status  
Single 75.00 (36) 79.49 (31) 0.245 
Married 25.00 (12) 20.51 (8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2. FEIT, TASIT, TAS and IRI scores (mean and range) in Patients with AN and HCs: t-
test results. 
 Patients with AN  
(95% CI) 
HCs 
(95% CI)  
p 
FEIT total 80.41 (77.73 - 83.09) 82.15 (79.02 - 85.28) 0.399 
FEIT_happy 82.39 (76.92 - 87.87) 86.21 (80.72 - 91.69) 0.320 
FEIT_sad 61.21 (51.34 - 71.08) 73.48 (65.98 - 80.97) 0.054 
FEIT_fear 67.24 (58.49 -73.99) 81.82 (75.72 - 88.92) 0.010 
FEIT_anger 81.63 (76.94 - 86.32) 79.81 (72.74 - 86.87) 0.672 
FEIT_surprise 96.06 (93.58 - 98.53) 90.04 (84.31 - 95.77) 0.066 
FEIT_disgust 87.18 (81.87 - 92.49) 77.90 (74.95 - 80.85) 0.028 
FEIT_neutral 90.63 (85.15 - 96.12) 87.00 (81.87 - 92.13) 0.328 
    
TAS-DIF 19.23 (16.93 - 21.53) 12.55 (10.98 - 14.12) <0.001 
TAS-DDF 16.06 (14.78 - 17.35) 12.90 (11.88 - 13.92) <0.001 
TAS-EOT 25.29 (23.93 - 26.64) 26.25 (25.02 - 27.48) 0.292 
TAS-TOTAL 60.26 (56.77 - 63.75) 51.70 (49.01 - 54.39) <0.001 
 
TASIT-EET1 10.27 (9.75 - 10.78) 10.85 (10.45 - 11.25) 0.072 
TASIT-EET2 14.60 (14.23 - 14.97) 14.61 (13.85 - 15.36) 0.981 
TASIT-SIM1 16.47 (15.29 - 17.64) 17.28 (15.90 - 18.66) 0.366 
TASIT-SIM2 17.63 (16.72 - 18.55) 17.97 (16.93 - 19.01) 0.619 
TASIT-SIM3 17.57 (16.53 - 18.61) 18.09 (17.43 - 18.76) 0.382 
TASIT-SIE1 26.13 (25.21 - 27.05) 25.75 (24.59 - 26.91) 0.603 
TASIT-SIE2 26.43 (25.37 - 27.50) 27.25 (26.17 - 28.33) 0.272 
 
IRI-F 19.13 (17.71 - 20.55) 19.80 (18.43 - 21.16) 0.498 
IRI-EC 21.00 (19.93 - 22.07) 20.23 (19.21 - 21.24) 0.297 
IRI-PT 22.06 (20.58 - 23.55) 22.10 (21.08 - 23.12) 0.954 
IRI-PD 20.74 (19.38 - 22.30) 18.35 (17.31 - 19.19) 0.009 
Note: TAS-DIF: Difficulty Identifying Feelings; TAS-DDF: Difficulty Discriminating Feelings; TAS-EOT: Externally 
Oriented Feelings; TASIT-EET1: Emotion Evaluation Task 1- Positive emotions; TASIT-EET2: Emotion Evaluation 
Task 2 – Negative emotions; TASIT-SIM 1: Social Inference Minimal 1 – Sincere exchanges; TASIT-SIM 2: Social 
Inference Minimal 2 – Sarcastic exchanges; TASIT-SIM 3: Social Inference Minimal 3 – Paradoxical Scripts; TASIT-
  
SIE 1: Social Inference Enriched 1 – Lies; TASIT-SIE 2: Social Inference Enriched 2: Sarcasm; IRI-F: Fantasy; IRI-
EC: Empathic Concern; IRI-PT: Perspective Taking; IRI-PD: Personal Distress. 
 
